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Federal, state, and local governments have dramatically increased cigarette excise taxes in recent years. From 1995 to 2001, the federal excise tax on cigarettes increased from 24 cents to 34 cents per pack, and nineteen states nominally increased cigarette taxes by 31 cents per pack on average. The popularity of cigarette excise taxes stems from their dual effects: they generate tax revenue from smokers who remain smoking and encourage marginal smokers to quit. The reduction in cigarette consumption in response to increased excise taxes is well documented: a review of earlier studies suggests that the estimated price elasticity of cigarette demand ranges from -.14 to -1.23 (see Chaloupka and Warner, 2000 , for a review), and may have increased to -2.1 in recent years (Goolsbee and Slemrod, 2004) . As a result, cigarette excise taxes are now an integral component of public policies to curb smoking.
The documented relationship between excise taxes and cigarette consumption may not be entirely causal, however. An important concern, and an often unaddressed issue in the literature, is the extent to which tobacco control policies reflects public sentiment towards smoking. If public sentiment towards smoking affects the prevalence of smoking and is also correlated with tobacco control policy, then the implied effect of tobacco control policies on the prevalence of smoking, without controlling for public sentiment, may be overstated (Wasserman et al. in particular, 1991; and Besley and Case, 2000, more generally) . If this were the case, then policies that change public sentiment towards smoking, such as health education, may be more effective at reducing smoking rates than tobacco control policies alone.
1 Therefore, to design 1 Tobacco control policies may be used to correct naïve assumptions about the health risks posed by smoking, serving as a substitute for health education (Viscusi, 1990) , so the implementation of tobacco taxes may ultimately impact public sentiment towards smoking. Evans and Farrelly (1998) , however, find that some smokers switch from lower to higher strength cigarettes in response to excise taxes to attenuate the effect of decreased cigarette consumption on actual tar and nicotine intake. Thus, for some individuals, cigarette taxes are not a perfect substitute for education about the health risks posed by smoking.
and implement effective policies to reduce cigarette consumption, it is important to isolate the causal effect of cigarette excise taxes on smoking.
In this study, I develop several proxies for public sentiment towards smoking and examine the correlation between these proxies and changes in federal and state excise taxes on cigarettes. The most straightforward proxy for public sentiment is the prevalence of smoking:
smokers are less averse to smoking than non smokers. I then disaggregate the prevalence of smoking along two dimensions: the prevalence of smokers who plan to quit and the prevalence of educated smokers. Smokers who plan to quit evidently disparage smoking more than smokers who do not want to quit. And the health behaviors of those with higher socioeconomic status, measured by education attainment, may serve as a leading indicator for public sentiment towards smoking. Therefore, the prevalence of smoking by intention to quit and education attainment arguably serve as better proxies for public sentiment towards smoking than the rate of smoking alone.
I first examine whether smoking status and, among smokers, the intention to quit is correlated with explicit support for a particular tobacco control policy: smoking bans in public places. The data come from the 1995 and 1996 Tobacco Supplements of the CPS. First, I find that non smokers favor smoking bans more than smokers, and smokers who plan to quit favor smoking bans more than smokers who do not plan to quit. If the differential support for public smoking bans reflects one's attitude towards smoking, then the prevalence of smoking by intention to quit status arguably serve as proxies for public sentiment towards smoking.
I then examine the correlation between proxies for public sentiment and changes in instrument the change in the price of cigarettes with the change in price due to federal and state excise tax increases. However, if changes in excise taxes are endogenous and correlated with public sentiment towards smoking, then the causal effect of taxes on smoking may be overstated.
Without controls for baseline sentiment, I find that the elasticity of cigarette demand is -2.0 and the elasticity of the smoking rate is -.48. When baseline proxies for public sentiment are included, the estimated elasticity of cigarette demand and the elasticity of the smoking rate decline to -1.27 and -.09, respectively. Thus, it appears that the causal effect of excise taxes on smoking is potentially overstated when public sentiment is not controlled.
There are numerous studies that examine the elasticity of cigarette demand to excise tax changes, but to my knowledge, only Ohsfeldt et al. (1999) explicitly address the potential endogeneity of cigarette excise taxes. In contrast to the results of this study, they find that the elasticity of cigarette demand actually increases when public sentiment is addressed. However, their empirical strategy is fundamentally different from the strategy considered here. Instead of using proxy variables to control for public sentiment, they use instruments for cigarette excise taxes based on government characteristics in an attempt to purge the effect of public sentiment on cigarette prices altogether. 2 But it is not obvious -nor do the authors clarify -what type of variation in cigarette prices these instruments isolate and therefore the extent to which this variation is exogeneous. Rather than using questionable instrumental variables to purge the effect of public sentiment from excise taxes, I attempt to directly control for public sentiment by using proxy variables.
I. Methodology and Data

A. Methodology
The empirical objective is to evaluate the extent to which tobacco control policy reflects public sentiment towards smoking. I first evaluate two proxies for public sentiment: smoking status and, among smokers, the intention to quit smoking. Naturally, smokers are less averse to smoking than non smokers, and smokers who want to quit disparage smoking more than smokers who do not want to quit. I first evaluate the correlation between smoking and intention to quit statuses with explicit support for public smoking bans. If smoking and intention to quit statuses are strongly correlated with support for smoking bans, and those who support smoking bans disparage smoking more than those who do not, then smoking prevalence and the prevalence of smokers who intend to quit may serve as proxies for smoking sentiment.
I then examine whether proxies for public sentiment towards smoking are correlated with recent increases in federal and state excise taxes on tobacco. If state excise taxes reflect public attitudes towards smoking, and smoking status serves as a proxy for smoking sentiment, then increases in excise taxes should be negatively correlated with the prevalence of smoking. The empirical specification is given by,
where log( ) n T Δ is some measure of the change in state excise taxes in state n , and n S is the baseline smoking rate in state n . The vector n X is a set of state-specific characteristics, and 1,n ε is an error term. The alternative hypothesis -the likelihood or magnitude of an excise tax increase is negatively associated with the prevalence smoking -is 1 0.
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As mentioned, the correlation between excise tax changes and the smoking rate may depend differentially on the prevalence of smokers who plan to quit. The empirical specification, with the smoking rate disaggregated by intention to quit status, is given by,
where q S and q S ( )S S S = + are the prevalence of smokers who plan to quit and do not plan to quit, respectively (state subscripts n are suppressed). If the prevalence of smokers who do not plan to quit serves as a better proxy for public sentiment towards smoking than smoking prevalence alone, then the negative correlation between tax increases and the prevalence of smoking should be greater with respect to the prevalence of smokers who do not want to quit:
In addition to the intention to quit, the negative correlation between excise taxes and the rate of smoking may depend differentially on the proportion of educated smokers. Previous research has shown that the historical decline in cigarette consumption in the US and in other countries is concentrated among the more educated (Pierce, 1989; Escobedo and Peddicord, 1996; Osler et al, 1998) . And second, previous economic research on signaling demonstrates that the higher end of the socioeconomic strata sets trends for certain behaviors; for example, popular fashion (Pesendorfer, 1995) and first names (Levitt and Fryer, 2004) . In the context of smoking, higher educated individual may choose not to smoke -and openly disparage smokingto signal their social status. Cigarette smoking would then be considered unfashionable, and lower ends of the social strata would eventually adopt a negative sentiment towards smoking.
Thus, the health behaviors of the more educated plausibly serves as a proxy for public health sentiment towards smoking and a leading indicator for changes in smoking prevalence. The empirical specification, with the prevalence of smoking disaggregated by education attainment, is given by, If the cigarette taxes reflect public sentiment towards smoking, and the prevalence of smokers by education and the intention to quit serve as better proxies for public sentiment than smoking rates alone, then state tax increases should be most sensitive to the prevalence of educated smokers who do not plan to quit. A more general function disaggregates smoking rates by both educational attainment and intention to quit status, If the prevalence of educated smokers who do not plan to quit serves as the best proxy among the other prevalence measures, then much of the negative correlation between tax increases and smoking prevalence should be driven by the prevalence of educated smokers who do not want to quit. Therefore, 3
λ should be greater in absolute value than the coefficients associated with the other prevalence measures.
The negative correlation between cigarette demand and cigarette taxes is well documented; but if public sentiment towards smoking affects the prevalence of smoking and is correlated with excise taxes, then the negative correlation between cigarette consumption and excise taxes may not be entirely causal. Therefore, I examine whether the elasticity of cigarette demand and smoking rates to price are sensitive to the inclusion of proxies for smoking sentiment. The specification for estimating the elasticity of cigarette demand is derived by firstdifferencing two, presumably equilibrium, outcomes at the state level,
To isolate variation in price changes due to excise taxes, i.e. the component of cigarette prices affected by policy, the change in price is instrumented with the predicted change in price due to excise tax changes:
, where 0 P is the baseline price of cigarettes and T Δ is the level change in excise taxes on cigarettes.
If sentiment towards smoking affects the demand for cigarettes throughυ , and sentiment is correlated with excise tax changes log( ) T Δ , then the instrument and the structural error term in equation (5) are positively correlated. Thus, the structural effect of price on cigarette demand, 1 π , is biased upwards. To address this concern, I include proxies for public sentiment in In this equation, the structural error term in equation (5) 
C. Data
The main data for the empirical analysis come from the Tobacco Supplements from the Current Population Survey. Supplements in certain years contain smoking status, intentions to quit (among smokers), former smoking status (among non smokers), and sentiment towards smoking bans in certain public places. To examine explicit support for smoking bans by smoking status, I pool CPS supplements in September 1995, January 1996, and May 1996.
Because proxy respondents are more likely to misreport smoking status and intentions to quit compared to non proxy respondents, I only consider non proxy survey responses. 4 I also focus on civilian adults. There are 193,808 observations that satisfy these criteria.
The pooled CPS data are also used to estimate state-level smoking prevalence measures, by intention to quit status and educational attainment, and state-specific characteristics for equations (1) through (4). Survey population weights are used to calculate state-level averages.
The outcome variable in estimation equations (1) through (4) is constructed using information on federal and state excise taxes, compiled from data provided by the Tax Policy Center of the Urban Institute and Brookings Institution; and cigarette prices, which are obtained from the Tax Burden on Tobacco (Orzechowski and Walker, 2003) . These data are presented by state in the Appendix For equations (5) and (6), I use the same smoking prevalence measures used in equations (1) 
II. Sentiment by Smoking Status: Smoking Bans
I first examine whether smoking status and intention to quit status are correlated with explicit support for a particular tobacco control policy; smoking bans in certain public places.
The proportions of individuals who favor smoking bans by smoking status and public place are presented in Table 1 . Panels A and B refer to non smokers and smokers, respectively, and the columns correspond to the public space. Across all spaces, non smokers favor smoking bans more than smokers. The order from most supported to least supported among smokers and non smokers alike is as follows; hospitals, sporting venues, work, shopping malls, restaurants, and bars. The largest difference in support between smokers and non smokers is in restaurants (56.9% versus 18.6%) and hospitals (83.2% versus 59.2%). Thus, the data suggest that the sentiment towards smoking, and explicit support for tobacco control policies, depends on smoking status.
In panel B, I disaggregate smokers by intention to quit status according to their response to a particular Tobacco Supplement question: "Are you seriously considering stopping within the next sixth months?" The sample size of smokers is reduced from 44,322 to 42,885 due to missing responses to the intention to quit question. As indicated, smokers who plan to quit support smoking bans in all spaces relative to those who do not plan to quit, suggesting that smokers who intend to quit disparage smoking more than smokers who do not plan to quit. Additionally, the smallest differences in support between these two groups are smoking bans in restaurants (27.3% versus 12.9%) and bars (8.9% versus 5.1%); two places commonly associated with smoking.
One interpretation is that smokers who plan to quit view smoking bans as a self-control device to aid them in their attempt to quit (Gruber, 2001) , and therefore favor bans more than those who do not plan to quit. 6 However, they may also hedge against an unsuccessful attempt at quitting by supporting bans relatively less in restaurants and bars.
I next examine differential support for bans among non smokers by whether they are former smokers (panel A of Table 1 ) and by whether they quit within the past year. As indicated, those who never smoked prefer smoking bans more than former smokers in all public spaces, and the difference in support is even greater when never smokers are compared to former smokers who recently quit. Consistent with the results in Panel B, the difference in support between never smokers and former smokers who recently quit is largest in restaurants (56.9% versus 32%) and bars (31.6% and 12.0%), which in this case may reflect hedging behavior among former smokers against smoking relapse.
Smoking status may be correlated with other factors that may affect sentiment towards smoking and therefore support for smoking bans. Therefore, I estimate first-difference models of support while simultaneously controlling for certain observable characteristics: age (linearly), sex (male and female), marital status (married and not married), educational attainment (high school or less and some college or more), race (white and non white), and labor force participation (participating and no participating). The first-differences estimators as estimated from two different samples: non smokers, by former smoking status, and current smokers, by intention to quit status.
The estimates from the first-difference, linear probability models are presented in Table   2 . Estimates among non smokers are presented in panel A (the left out group is former smokers) and estimates among smokers are presented in panel B (the left out group is smokers who do not plan to quit). Within each panel, estimates with and without controls are given in rows I and II, respectively. As indicated, the differential support for smoking bans among the two sets of groups is robust to the inclusion of observable characteristics. Furthermore, the largest difference in support for bans among non smokers by former smoking status, and smallest difference in support for bans among smokers by intention to quit status, is in restaurants and bars. All estimated differences are also robust to the inclusion of certain observable characteristics.
III. Sentiment and Public Policy: Cigarette Excise Taxes
A. Summary of Data
I next consider whether proxies for smoking sentiment are correlated with increases in cigarette excise taxes. The data for the analysis are summarized in .10) and an F-statistic of 13.4. Furthermore, states with larger increases in state excise taxes exhibited relatively larger declines in per capita cigarette sales and smoking rates. Figure 1 plots the change in log per capita cigarette sales against the change in log excise tax price and illustrates a negative correlation between state excise taxes and cigarette demand.
The second set of variables corresponds to smoking prevalence by intention to quit and education attainment. Individuals are separated into two groups according to education attainment: less educated, defined as high school or less, and more educated, defined as some college and more. Indicated in the first column, the smoking prevalence of the less educated is greater than the prevalence of the more educated: 13.1% versus 8.4%. The differential prevalence of smoking by education attainment does not result from a higher prevalence of less educated individuals: in the final panel of Table 3 , the sample is almost evenly split between less and higher educated individuals. The data also indicate that the proportion of educated smokers who want to quit is greater than the proportion of educated smokers who do not, whereas the opposite is true among less educated smokers. Because more educated individual are less likely to smoke, and a larger proportion of educated smokers would like to quit, the prevalence of smoking among the more educated by intention to quit status may serve as a leading indicator for public sentiment towards smoking. However, in states with relatively larger excise tax increases, the educated smoker population is split evenly between those who want to quit and those who do not. Thus, it appears that excise tax increases are correlated with the prevalence of smoking, particularly the prevalence of smoking and intention to quit among the more educated.
The final panel of 
B. Estimation Results
Estimates of equations (1) through (4) are presented in Table 4 . In panel I, the outcome variable is binary, equaling one if the log change in excise taxes -between 1995 and 2001 relative to the average cigarette price in 1995 -is greater than .075 and zero otherwise. In panel II, the outcome variable is the actual log change in excise taxes relative to the average cigarette price in 1995.
I first estimate the likelihood and magnitude of excise tax increases with respect to changes in the rate of smoking -equation (1) above. As indicated in columns (1), states are less likely to increase cigarette taxes, and increase them by less, as the prevalence of smoking increases: a one percent increase in the smoking rate is associated with a .09 percent decline in the probability of increasing excise taxes and a .01 percent decline in the actual change in excise taxes.
I then disaggregate smoking prevalence by intention to quit -equation (2) above. Again, if the prevalence of smokers who intend to quit is a better proxy for public sentiment towards smoking than the prevalence of smoking alone, then much of the negative correlation between excise taxes increases and the prevalence of smoking should be driven primarily by the prevalence of smokers who do not want to quit. The results, in columns (2), confirm this contention. A one percent increase in the prevalence of smokers who do not intend to quit is associated with a .1 percent decline in the likelihood of an excise tax increase -the coefficient on the prevalence of smokers is -.05 and statistically insignificant.
I then disaggregate the smoking rate by educational attainment -equation (3) above. If the smoking rate among the more educated is a better proxy for public sentiment towards smoking, then much of the negative correlation between smoking prevalence and excise taxes should be driven by the prevalence of educated smokers. The results, presented in columns (3), suggest that this is indeed the case: a one percent increase in the prevalence of educated smokers is associated with a .18 percent decline in the likelihood of an excise tax increase. In contrast, the partial correlation between state excise tax increases and the prevalence of less educated smokers is nearly zero and statistically insignificant. The heterogeneous effect of smoking prevalence by educational attainment also holds for actual changes in excise taxes, presented in panel II.
Finally, I disaggregate the smoking prevalence by both educational attainment and intention to quit status -equation (4) above. Based on previous arguments, the prevalence of educated smokers who do not want to quit is arguably the best proxy for public sentiment towards smoking among those considered, so the partial correlation between excise taxes and this prevalence measure should be greatest compared to other prevalence measures. As indicated in column (4) of both panels, much of the negative correlation between excise taxes and smoking prevalence is driven by the prevalence of educated smokers who do not want to quit. Taken together, the results suggest that public sentiment towards smoking is indeed correlated with tobacco control policies.
IV. Price Elasticity of Cigarette Demand
If public sentiment towards smoking affects changes in the rate of smoking and is also correlated with tobacco control policies, then the effect of tobacco control policies on smoking may be overstated. Therefore, I estimate the elasticity of cigarette demand and smoking prevalence with respect to the total price of cigarettes with and without the inclusion of proxies for public sentiment. The specification equation, given in equations (5) and (6) above, consists of regressing the change in cigarette demand or the prevalence of smoking on the change in the average price of cigarettes by state. To isolate the effect of excise tax policy on cigarette prices, the actual change in the average price of cigarettes within a state is instrumented with the change in federal and state excise taxes relative to the state-average price of cigarettes in 1995.
The elasticity estimates are presented in Table 5 . The panels correspond to different outcome variables: panel I is per-capita tobacco sales, panel II is the rate of smoking, and panels III and IV correspond to the unconditional rate of smoking among the more educated and less educated, respectively. In each panel, the first column gives the estimated elasticity without including baseline proxies for smoking sentiment, and the second column reflects the estimated elasticity controlling for baseline proxies for smoking sentiment.
As indicated in panel I, the price elasticity of cigarette demand is -2.0 and statistically significant. Similar to the findings of Goolsebee and Slemrod (2004) , the estimated elasticity during the 1990s is high relative to previous years. However, the estimated elasticity declines to -1.27 when the proxies for public sentiment are included, which suggests that the effect of taxes on cigarette demand is overstated when public sentiment is not controlled.
The estimated elasticity of the smoking rate with respect to price also declines when proxies for public sentiment are included, indicated in panel II. Without controlling for sentiment, the elasticity of the smoking rate is -.48, but declines to -.09 when baseline proxies for smoking sentiment are included, though neither estimate is statistically significant.
The results in panels III and IV, which contains elasticity estimates of the smoking rate by education attainment status, suggests that the rate of smoking among the less educated is more responsive to price than the rate of smoking among the more educated, -.708 versus -.405, which is consistent with previous studies in the literature (Townsend et al., 1994) . However, the elasticity estimates for the less educated declines in magnitude, and the elasticity among the more educated reverses sign, when baseline proxies for sentiment are included.
V. Conclusion
In this study, I examine whether proxies for public sentiment towards smoking are correlated with explicit support for tobacco control policies and subsequent changes in tobacco control laws. The rate of smoking naturally serves as a proxy for public sentiment towards smoking, but I also disaggregate the prevalence of smoking by education attainment and intention to quit status. The prevalence of educated smokers who do not want to quit is perhaps the best proxy for public sentiment towards smoking and consequently changes in cigarette demand. The results indicate that there is negative correlation between excise tax increases and the prevalence of smoking, which is driven primarily by the prevalence of educated smokers who do not want to quit. Thus, it appears that public sentiment towards smoking is an important factor for whether and to what extent tobacco control policies are implemented.
If tobacco control policies such as cigarette excise taxes and smoking bans are correlated with public sentiment towards smoking, and smoking sentiment affects future demand for cigarettes, then the causal effect of tobacco control policies on cigarette demand may be overstated. I find that when the proxies for public sentiment are controlled, the estimated price elasticity of cigarette demand declines by approximately 38% (from -2.0 to -1.3) and the elasticity of the rate of smoking declines by 81% (from -.481 to .092). Thus, it appears that the decline in cigarette consumption and increase in excise taxes reflects, to a certain extent, public sentiment towards smoking.
If reducing the rate of smoking is a prescribed policy goal, the results presented here suggest that public sentiment and tobacco control policies move in tandem. Therefore, to reduce the prevalence of smoking, cigarette excise taxes may not be a perfect substitute for policies that change public sentiment, and are more realistically a complement health education.
